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Person A training samples. Is this person A ?
Fig. 1: An illustration of one of the scenarios considered: can a vision system
recognise that the person in the right image is the same as the tagged person in
the left images, even when the head is obfuscated?
Abstract. As we shift more of our lives into the virtual domain, the
volume of data shared on the web keeps increasing and presents a threat
to our privacy. This works contributes to the understanding of privacy
implications of such data sharing by analysing how well people are recog-
nisable in social media data. To facilitate a systematic study we define
a number of scenarios considering factors such as how many heads of a
person are tagged and if those heads are obfuscated or not. We propose
a robust person recognition system that can handle large variations in
pose and clothing, and can be trained with few training samples. Our
results indicate that a handful of images is enough to threaten users’ pri-
vacy, even in the presence of obfuscation. We show detailed experimental
results, and discuss their implications.
Keywords: Privacy, Person recognition, Social media.
1 Introduction
With the growth of the internet, more and more people share and disseminate
large amounts of personal data be it on webpages, in social networks, or through
personal communication. The steadily growing computation power, advances in
machine learning, and the growth of the internet economy, have created strong
revenue streams and a thriving industry built on monetising user data. It is
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2 Oh et al.
clear that visual data contains private information, yet the privacy implications
of this data dissemination are unclear, even for computer vision experts. We are
aiming for a transparent and quantifiable understanding of the loss in privacy
incurred by sharing personal data online, both for the uploader and other users
who appear in the data.
In this work, we investigate the privacy implications of disseminating photos
of people through social media. Although social media data allows to identify
a person via different data types (timeline, geolocation, language, user profile,
etc.) [1], we focus on the pixel content of an image. We want to know how well
a vision system can recognise a person in social photos (using the image content
only), and how well users can control their privacy when limiting the number of
tagged images or when adding varying degrees of obfuscation (see figure 1) to
their heads.
An important component to extract maximal information out of visual data
in social networks is to fuse different data and provide a joint analysis. We
propose our new Faceless Person Recogniser (described in §5), which not only
reasons about individual images, but uses graph inference to deduce identities
in a group of non-tagged images. We study the performance of our system on
multiple privacy sensitive user scenarios (described in §3), analyse the main
results in §6, and discuss implications and future work in §7. Since we focus
on the image content itself, our results are a lower-bound on the privacy loss
resulting from sharing such images.
Our contributions are:
– We discuss dimensions that affect the privacy of online photos, and define
a set of scenarios to study the question of privacy loss when social media
images are aggregated and processed by a vision system.
– We propose our new Faceless Person Recogniser, which uses convnet features
in a graphical model for joint inference over identities.
– We study the interplay and effectiveness of obfuscation techniques with re-
gard of our vision system.
2 Related work
Nowadays, essentially all online activities can be potentially used to identify an
internet user [1]. Privacy of users in social network is a well studied topic in the
security community [2, 3, 1, 4]. There are works which consider the relationship
between privacy and photo sharing activities [5, 6], yet they do not perform
quantitative studies.
Camera recognition. Some works have shown that it is possible to identify the
camera taking the photos (and thus link photos and events via the photogra-
pher), either from the file itself [7] or from recognisable sensing noise [8, 9]. In
this work we focus exclusively on the image content, and leave the exploita-
tion of image content together with other forms of privacy cues (e.g. additional
meta-data from the social network) for future work.
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Image types. Most previous work on person recognition in images has focused
either on face images [10] (mainly frontal head) or on the surveillance scenario
[11, 12], where the full body is visible, usually in low resolution. Like other areas
of computer vision, the last years have seen a shift from classifiers based on hand-
crafted features and metric learning approaches [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] towards
methods based on deep learning [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. Different from face
recognition and surveillance scenarios, the social network images studied here
tend to show a diverse range of poses, activities, points of view, scenes (indoors,
outdoors), and illumination. This increased diversity makes recognition more
challenging and only a handful of works have addressed explicitly this scenario
[28, 29, 30]. We construct our experiments on top of the recently introduced
PIPA dataset [29], discussed in §4.
Recognition tasks. The notion of “person recognition” encompasses multiple re-
lated problems [31]. Typical “person recognition” considers a few training samples
over many different identities, and a large test set. It is thus akin to fine grained
categorization. When only one training sample is available and many test images
(typical for face recognition and surveillance scenarios [10, 12, 32]), the problem
is usually named “re-identification”, and it becomes akin to metric learning or
ranking problems. Other related tasks are, for example, face clustering [33, 26],
finding important people [34], or associating names in text to faces in images
[35, 36]. In this work we focus on person recognition with on average 10 training
samples per identity (and hundreds of identities), as in typical social network
scenario.
Cues. Given a rough bounding box locating a person, different cues can be used
to recognise a person. Much work has focused on the face itself ([20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 37] to name a few recent ones). Pose-independent descriptors
have been explored for the body region [28, 38, 39, 29, 30]. Various other cues
have been explored, for example: attributes classification [40, 41], social context
[42, 43], relative camera positions [44], space-time priors [45], and photo-album
priors [46]. In this work, we build upon [30] which fuses multiple convnet cues
from head, body, and the full scene. As we will discuss in the following sections,
we will also indirectly use photo-album information.
Identify obfuscation. Some previous works have considered the challenges of de-
tection and recognition under obfuscation (e.g. see figure 1). Recently, [47] quan-
tified the decrease in Facebook face detection accuracy with respect to different
types of obfuscation, e.g. blur, blacking-out, swirl, and dark spots. However, on
principle, obfuscation patterns can expose faces at a higher risk of detection by
a fine-tuned detector (e.g. blur detector). Unlike their work, we consider the
identification problem with a system adapted to obfuscation patterns. Similarly,
a few other works studied face recognition under blur [48, 49]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider person recognition under head
obfuscation using a trainable system that leverages full-body cues.
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3 Privacy scenarios
Fully visible Gaussian blur
Black fill-in White fill-in
Fig. 2: Obfuscation types consid-
ered.
We consider a hypothetical social photo
sharing service user. The user has a set
of photos of herself and others in her ac-
count. Some of these photos have identity
tags and the others do not have such iden-
tity tags. We assume that all heads on the
test photos have been detected, either by
an automatic detection system, or because
a user is querying the identity of a specific
head. Note that we do not assume that the
faces are visible nor that persons are in
a frontal-upstanding pose. A “tag” is an
association between a given head and a
unique identifier linked to a specific iden-
tity (social media user profile).
Goal. The task of our recognition system
is to identify a person of interest (marked
via its head bounding box), by leveraging all the photos available (both with and
without identity tags). In this work, we want to explore how effective different
strategies are to protect the user identity.
We consider four different dimensions that affect how hard or easy it is to
recognise a user:
Number of tagged heads. We vary the number of tagged images available per
identity. The more tagged images available, the easier it should be to recognise
someone in new photos. In the experiments of §5 & §6 we consider that 1∼ 10
tagged images are available per person.
Obfuscation type. Users concerned with their privacy might take protective
measures by blurring or masking their heads. Other than the fully visible case
(non-obfuscated), we consider three other obfuscations types, shown in figure 2.
We consider both black and white, since [47] showed that commercial systems
might react differently to these. The blurring parameters are chosen to resemble
the YouTube face blur feature.
Amount of obfuscation. Depending on the user’s activities (and her friends
posting photos of her), not all photos might be obfuscated. We consider a variable
fraction of these.
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Table 1: Privacy scenarios considered. Each row in the table can be applied
for the “across events” and “within events” case, and over different obfusca-
tion types. See text §3. The obfuscation fraction indicates tagged/non-tagged
heads. Bold abbreviations are reused in follow-up figures. In scenario Sτ1 ,
τ ∈ {1.25, 2.5, 5, 10}.
Abbre-
viation Brief description
Amount of
tagged heads
Amount of
obfuscated heads
S0 Privacy indifferent 100% 0%
Sτ1 Some of my images are tagged τ instances 0%
S2 One non-tagged head is obfuscated 10 instances 0%/1 instance
S3 All my heads are obfuscated 10 instances 100%
S′3 All tagged heads are obfuscated 10 instances 100%/0%
S′′3 All non-tagged heads are obfuscated 10 instances 0%/100%
Domain shift. For the recognition task, there is a difference if all photos belong
to the same event, where the appearance of people change little; or if the set of
photos without tags correspond to a different event than the ones with identity
tags. Recognising a person when the clothing, context, and illumination have
changed (“across events”) is more challenging than when they have not (“within
events”).
Based on these four dimensions, we discuss a set of scenarios, summarised in
table 1. Clearly, these only cover a subset of all possible combinations along the
mentioned four dimensions. However, we argue that this subset covers important
and relevant aspects for our exploration on privacy implications.
Scenario S0. Here all heads are fully visible and tagged. Since all heads are
tagged, the user is fully identifiable. This is the classic case without any
privacy.
Scenario S1. There is no obfuscation but not all images are tagged. This is
the scenario commonly considered for person recognition, e.g. [28, 29, 30].
Unless otherwise specified we use S101 , where an average of 10 instances of the
person are tagged (average across all identities). This is a common scenario
for social media users, where some pictures are tagged, but many are not.
Scenario S2. Here the user has all of her heads visible, except for the one non-
tagged head being queried. This would model the case where the user wants
to conceal her identity in one particular published photo.
Scenario S3. The user aims at protecting her identity by obfuscating all her
heads (using any obfuscation type, see figure 2). Both tagged and non-tagged
heads are obfuscated. This scenario models a privacy concerned user. Note
that the body is still visible and thus usable to recognise the user.
Scenarios S′3&S′′3 . These consider the case of a user that inconsistently uses
the obfuscation tactic to protect her identity. Albeit on the surface these
seems like different scenarios, if the visual information of the heads cannot
be propagated from/to the tagged/non-tagged heads, then these are func-
tionally equivalent to S3.
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Each of these scenarios can be applied for the “across/within events” dimension.
In the following sections we will build a system able to recognise persons across
these different scenarios, and quantify the effect of each dimension on the recog-
nition capabilities (and thus their implication on privacy). For our system, the
tagged heads become training data, while the non-tagged heads are used as test
data.
4 Experimental setup
We investigate the scenarios proposed in §3 through a set of controlled exper-
iments on a recently introduced social media dataset: PIPA (People In Photo
Albums) [29]. In this section, we project the scenarios in §3 onto specific aspects
of the PIPA dataset, describing how much realism can be achieved and what are
possible limitations.
PIPA dataset. The PIPA dataset [29] consists of annotated social media photos
on Flickr. It contains ∼40k images over ∼2k identities, and captures subjects ap-
pearing in diverse social groups (e.g. friends, colleagues, family) and events (e.g.
conference, vacation, wedding). Compared to previous social media datasets,
such as [28] (∼ 600 images, 32 identities), PIPA presents a leap both in size and
diversity. The heads are annotated with a bounding box and an identity tag.
The individuals appear in diverse poses, point of view, activities, sceneries, and
thus cover an interesting slice of the real world. See examples in [29, 30], as well
as figures 1 and 14.
One possible limitation of the dataset, is that only repeating identities have been
annotated (i.e. a subset of all persons appearing in the images). However, with a
test set covering ∼13k instances over ∼600 identities (∼20 instances/identity),
it still presents a large enough set of identities to enable an interesting study
and derive relevant conclusions. We believe PIPA is currently the best public
dataset for studying questions regarding privacy in social media photos.
Albums. From the Flickr website, each photo is associated with an album iden-
tifier. The ∼ 13k test instances are grouped in ∼ 8k photos belonging to ∼ 350
albums. We use the photo album information indirectly during our graph infer-
ence (§5.3).
Protocol. The PIPA dataset defines train, validation, and test partitions (∼17k,
∼ 5k, ∼ 8k photos respectively), each containing disjoint sets of identities [29].
The train partition is used for convnet training. The validation data is used
for component-wise evaluation of our system, and the test set for drawing final
conclusions. The validation and test partitions are further divided into split0
and split1. Each split0/1 contains half of the instances for each identity in the
validation and test sets (∼10 instances/identity per split, on average).
Splits. When instantiating the scenarios from §3, the tagged faces are all part of
split0. In S1, S2, and S3, split1 is never tagged. The task of our Faceless Person
Recognition System is to recognise every query instance from split1, possibly
leveraging other non-tagged instances in split1.
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Domain shift. Other than the one split defined in [29], [30] proposed additional
splits with increasing recognition difficulty. We use the “Original” split as a good
proxy for the “within events” case, and the “Day” split for “across events”. In the
day split, split0 and split1 contain images of a given person across different days.
5 Faceless Recognition System
In this section, we introduce the Faceless Recognition System to study the effec-
tiveness of privacy protective measures in §3. We choose to build our own baseline
system, as opposed to using an existing system as in [47], for adaptibility of the
system to obfuscation and reproducibility for future research.
Our system does joint recognition employing a conditional random field
(CRF) model. CRF often used for joint recognition problems in computer vision
[42, 43, 50, 51]. It enables the communication of information across instances,
strengthening weak individual cues. Our CRF model is formulated as follows:
argmax
Y
1
|V |
∑
i∈V
φθ(Yi|Xi) + α|E|
∑
(i, j)∈E
1[Yi=Yj ]ψθ˜(Xi, Xj) (1)
with observations Xi, identities Yi and unary potentials φθ(Yi|Xi) defined on
each node i ∈ V (detailed in §5.1) as well as pairwise potentials ψθ˜(Xi, Xj)
defined on each edge (i, j) ∈ E (detailed in §5.2). 1[·] is the indicator function,
and α > 0 controls the unary-pairwise balance.
Unary. We build our unary φθ upon a state of the art, publicly available person
recognition system, naeil [30]. The system was shown to be robust to decreasing
number of tagged examples. It uses not only the face but also context (e.g. body
and scene) as cues. Here, we also explore its robustness to obfuscation, see §5.1.
Pairwise. By adding pairwise terms over the unaries, we expect that the system
to propagate predictions across nodes (instances). When a unary prediction is
weak (e.g. obfuscated head), the system aggregates information from connected
nodes with possibly stronger predictions (e.g. visible face), and thus deduce the
query identity. Our pairwise term ψθ˜ is a siamese network build on top of the
unary features, see §5.2.
Experiments on the validation set indicate that, for all scenarios, the per-
formance improves with increasing values of α, and reaches the plateau around
α = 102. We use this value for all the experiments and analysis.
In the rest of the section, we provide a detailed description of the different
parts and evaluate our system component-wise.
5.1 Single person recognition
We build our single person recogniser (the unary potential φθ of the CRF model)
upon the state of the art person recognition system naeil [30].
First, 17 AlexNet [52] cues are extracted and concatenated from multiple
regions (head, body, and scene) defined relative to the ground truth head boxes.
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Fig. 3: Impact of head obfuscation on our unary term. Compared to visible (unob-
fuscated) case, it struggles on obfuscations (blur, black, and white); nonetheless,
it is still far better than the naive baseline classifier that blindly predicts the most
popular class. “Adapted” means CNN models are trained for the corresponding
obfuscation type.
We then train per-identity logistic regression models on top of the resulting
4096× 17 dimensional feature vector, which constitute the φθ(·|Xi) vector.
The AlexNet models are trained on the PIPA train set, while the logistic
regression weights are trained on the tagged examples (split0). For each obfus-
cation case, we also train new AlexNet models over obfuscated images (referred
to as “adapted” in figure 3). We assume that at test time the obfuscation can be
easily detected, and the appropriate model is used. We always use the “adapted”
model unless otherwise stated.
Figures 3 and 4 evaluate our unary term over the PIPA validation set, under
different obfuscation, within/across events, and with varying number of train-
ing tags. In the following, we discuss our main findings on how single person
recognition is affected by these measures.
Adapted models are effective for blur. When comparing “adapted” to “non-adapted”
in figure 3, we see that adaptation of the convnet models is overall positive. It
makes minor differences for black or white fill-in, but provides a good boost in
recognition accuracy for the blur case, especially in the across events case (5+
percent points gain).
Robustness to obfuscation. After applying black obfuscation in the within events
case, our unary performs only slightly worse (from “visible” 91.5% to “black
adapted” 80.9%). This is 80 times better than a naive baseline classifier (1.04%)
that blindly predicts the most popular class. In the across events case, the “visi-
ble” performance drops from from 47.4% to 14.7%, after black obfuscation, which
is still more than 3 times accurate than the naive baseline (4.65%).
Black and white fill-in have similar effects. [47] suggests that white fill-in con-
fuses a detection system more than does the black. In our recognition setting,
black and white fill-in have similar effects: 80.9% and 79.6% respectively, for
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Fig. 4: Single person recogniser at different tag rates.
Correct pair
Incorrect pair
Fig. 5: Matching
in social media.
within events, adapted case (see figure 3). Thus, we omit the experiments for
white fill-in obfuscation in the next sections.
The system is robust to small number of tags. As shown in figure 4 the single
person recogniser is robust to a small number of identity tags. For example,
in the within events, visible case, it performs at 69.9% accuracy even at 1.25
instances/identity tag rate, while using 10 instances/identity it achieves 91.5%.
5.2 Person pair matching
In this section, we introduce a method for predicting matches between a pair
of persons based on head and body cues. This is the pairwise term in our CRF
formulation (equation 2). Note that person pair matching in social media context
is challenging due to clothing changes and varying poses (see figure 5).
We build a Siamese neural network to compute the match probability ψθ˜(Xi,Xj).
A pair of instances are given as input, whose head and body features are then
computed using the single person recogniser (§5.1), resulting in a 2× (2× 4096)
dimensional feature vector. These features are passed through three fully con-
nected layers with ReLU activations with a binary prediction at the end (match,
no-match).
We first train the siamese network on the PIPA train set, and then fine-tune
it over split0, the set of tagged samples. We train three types of models: one
for visible pairs, one for obfuscated pairs, and one for mixed pairs. Like for the
unary term, we assume that obfuscation is detected at test time, so that the
appropriate model is used. Further details can be found in the supplementary
materials.
Evaluation. Figure 6 shows the matching performance. We evaluate on the set
of pairs within albums (used for graph inference in §5.3). The performance is
evaluated in the equal error rate (EER), the accuracy at the score threshold
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Fig. 6: Person pair matching on the set of pairs in photo albums. The numbers
in parentheses are the equal error rates (EER). The “visible unary base” refers
to the baseline where only unaries are used to determine match.
where false positive and false negative rates meet. The three obfuscation type
models are evaluated on the corresponding obfuscation pairs.
Fine-tuning on split0 is crucial. By fine-tuning on the tagged examples of query
identities, matching performance improves significantly. For the visible pair model,
EER improves from 79.1% to 92.7% in the within events setting, and from 74.5%
to 81.4% in across events.
Unary baseline. In order to evaluate whether the matching network has learned
to predict match better than its initialisation model, we consider the unary base-
line. See “visible unary base” in figure 6. It first compares the unary prediction
(argmax) for a given pair, and then determines its confidence using the prediction
entropies. See supplementary materials for more detail.
The unary baseline performs marginally better than the visible pair model
under the within events: 93.7% versus 92.7%. Under the across events, on the
other hand, the visible pair model beats the baseline by a large margin: 81.4%
versus 67.4% (figure 6). In practice, the system has no information whether the
query image is from within or across events. The system thus uses the pairwise
trained model (visible pair model), which performs better on average.
General comments. The matching network performs better under the within
events setting than across events, and better for the visible pairs than for mixed
or black pairs. See figure 6.
5.3 Graph inference
Given the unaries from §5.1 and pairwise from §5.2, we perform a joint inference
to perform more robust recognition. The graph inference is implemented via
PyStruct [53]. The results of the joint inference (for the black obfuscation case)
are presented in figure 7, and discussed in the next paragraphs.
Faceless Person Recognition 11
S1 S2 S3
0
20
40
60
80
100
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
(a) Within events
S1 S2 S3
0
20
40
60
80
100
a
cc
u
ra
cy
unary
unary+pairwise
unary+pairwise (no pruning)
unary+pairwise (oracle)
(b) Across events
Fig. 7: Validation performance of the CRF joint inference in three scenarios, S1,
S2, and S3 (see §3), under black fill-in obfuscation. After graph pruning, joint
inference provides a gain over the unary in all scenarios.
Across-album edge pruning. We introduce some graph pruning strategies which
make the inference tractible and more robust to noisy predictions. Some of the
scenarios considered (e.g. S2) require running inference for each instance in the
test set (∼ 6k for within events). In order to lower down the computational
cost from days to hours, we prune all edges across albums. The resulting graph
only has fully connected cliques within albums. The across-album edge pruning
reduces the number of edges by two orders of magnitude.
Negative edge pruning. As can be seen in figure 7, simply adding pairwise terms
(“unary+pairwise (no pruning)”) can hurt the unaries only performance. This
happens because many pairwise terms are erroneous. This can be mitigated by
only selecting confident (high quality, low recall) predictions from ψθ˜. We found
that selecting positive pairs ψθ˜(Xi,Xj) ≥ 0.5 works best (any threshold in the
range [0.4, 0.7] works equally fine). These are the “unary+pairwise” results in
figure 7, which show an improvement over the unary case, especially for the
across events setting. The main gain is observed for S2 (one obfuscated head)
across events, where the pairwise term brings a jump from 15% to 39%.
Oracle pairwise. To put in context the gains from the graph inference, we build
an oracle case that assumes perfect pairwise potentials (ψθ˜(Xi,Xj) = 1[Yi=Yj ],
where 1[·] is the indicator function and Y are the ground truth identities ). We
do not perform negative edge pruning here. The unaries are the same as for the
other cases in figure 7. We can see that the “unary+pairwise” results are within
70%+ of the oracle case “(oracle)”, indicating that the pairwise potential ψθ˜ is
rather strong. The cases where the oracle perform poorly (e.g. S3 across events),
indicate that stronger unaries or better graph inference is needed. Finally, even
if no negative edge is pruned, adding oracle pairwise improves the performance,
indicating that negative edge pruning is needed only when pairwise is imperfect.
Recognition rates are far from chance level. After graph inference, all scenarios
in the within event case reach recognition rates above 80% (figure 7a). When
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across events, both S1 and S2 are above 35% (figure 7b). These are recognition
far above the chance level (1%/5% within/across events, shown in figure 3). Only
S3 (all user heads with black obfuscation) show a dreadful drop in recognition
rate, where neither the unaries nor the pairwise terms bring much help. See
supplementary materials for more details in this section.
6 Test set results & analysis
Following the experimental protocol in §4, we now evaluate our Faceless Recog-
nition System on the PIPA test set. The main results are summarised in figures
8 and 9. We observe the same trends as the validation set results discussed in
§5. Figure 14 shows some qualitative results over the test set. We organize the
results along the same privacy sensitive dimensions that we defined in §3 in order
to build our study scenarios.
Amount of tagged heads. Figure 8 shows that even with only 1.25 tagged photos
per person on average, the system can recognise users far better than chance level
(naive baseline; best guess before looking at the image). Even with such little
amount of training data, the system predicts 56.8% of the instances correctly
within events and 31.9% across events; which is 73× and 16× higher than chance
level, respectively. We see that even few tags provide a threat for privacy and
thus users concerned with their privacy should avoid having (any of) their photos
tagged.
Obfuscation type. For both scenario S2 and S3, figure 9 (and the results from
§5.1) indicates the same privacy protection ranking for the different obfuscation
types. From higher protection to lower protection, we have Black ≈ White >
Blur > Visible. Albeit blurring does provide some protection, the machine learn-
ing algorithm still extracts useful information from that region. When our full
Faceless Recognition System is in use, one can see that (figure 9) obfuscation
helps, but only to a limited degree: e.g. 86.4% (S1) to 71.3% (S3) under within
events and 51.1% (S1) to 23.9% (S3) under across events.
Amount of obfuscation. We cover three scenarios: every head fully visible (S1),
only the test head obfuscated (S2), and every head fully obfuscated (S3). Figure 9
shows that within events obfuscating either one (S2) or all (S3) heads is not very
effective, compared to the across events case, where one can see larger drops for
S1 → S2 and S2 → S3. Notice that unary performances are identical for S2 and
S3 in all settings, but using the full system raises the recognition accuracy for S2
(since seeing the other heads allow to rule-out identities for the obfuscated head).
We conclude that within events head obfuscation has only limited effectiveness,
across events only blacking out all heads seems truly effective (S3 black).
Domain shift. In all scenarios, the recognition accuracy is significantly worse in
the across events case than within events (about ∼50% drop in accuracy across
all other dimensions). For a user, it is a better privacy policy to make sure no
tagged heads exist for the same event, than blacking out all his heads in the
event.
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Fig. 8: Impact of number of tagged examples: S1.251 , S2.51 , S51 , and S101 .
(a) Within events (b) Across events
Fig. 9: Co-recognition results for scenarios S101 , S2, and S3 with black fill-in and
Gaussian blur obfuscations (white fill-in match black results).
Fig. 10: Examples of queries in across events setting, not identified using only
tagged (red boxes) samples, but successfully identified by the Faceless Recog-
nition System via joint prediction of the query and non-tagged (white boxes)
examples. A subset of both tagged and non-tagged examples are shown; there
are ∼ 10 tagged and non-tagged examples originally. Non-tagged examples are
ordered in the match score against the query (closest match on the left).
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7 Discussion & Conclusion
Within the limitation of any study based on public data, we believe the results
presented here are a fresh view on the capabilities of machine learning to enable
person recognition in social media under adversarial condition. From a privacy
perspective, the results presented here should raise concern. We show that, when
using state of the art techniques, blurring a head has limited effect. We also
show that only a handful of tagged heads are enough to enable recognition, even
across different events (different day, clothes, poses, point of view). In the most
aggressive scenario considered (all user heads blacked-out, tagged images from a
different event), the recognition accuracy of our system is 12× higher than chance
level. It is very probable that undisclosed systems similar to the ones described
here already operate online. We believe it is the responsibility of the computer
vision community to quantify, and disseminate the privacy implications of the
images users share online. This work is a first step in this direction. We conclude
by discussing some future challenges and directions on privacy implications of
social visual media.
Lower bound on privacy threat. The current results focused singularly on the
photo content itself and therefore a lower bound of the privacy implication of
posting such photos. It remains as future work to explore an integrated system
that will also exploit the images’ meta-data (timestamp, geolocation, camera
identifier, related user comments, etc.). In the context of the era of “selfie” photos,
meta-data can be as effective as head tags. Younger users also tend to cross-post
across multiple social media, and make a larger use of video (e.g. Vine). Using
these data-form will require developing new techniques.
Training and test data bounds. The performance of recent techniques of feature
learning and inference are strongly coupled with the amount of available training
data. Person recognition systems like [20, 27, 26] all rely on undisclosed train-
ing data in the order of millions of training samples. Similarly, the evaluation
of privacy issues in social networks requires access to sensitive data, which is
often not available to the public research community (for good reasons [1]). The
used PIPA dataset [29] serves as good proxy, but has its limitations. It is an
emerging challenge to keep representative data in the public domain in order to
model privacy implications of social media and keep up with the rapidly evolving
technology that is enabled by such sources.
From analysing to enabling. In this work, we focus on the analysis aspect of
person recognition in social media. In the future, one would like to translate
such analyses to actionable systems that enable users to control their privacy
while still enabling communication via visual media exchanges.
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Supplementary Materials
A Content
Section B of this supplementary materials provides details of the training pro-
cedure for the model components. Sections C and G present the quantitative
tables behind the bar plots of the main paper. Section D discusses in more detail
the pairwise term of our model. Section E discuss in more detail some of the
design choices for the graph inference. Section F gives the rough computation
cost of our method. Finally section H shows additional qualitative examples of
our faceless recognition system.
B Convnet training details
The convnet parts of our recognition system are built using Caffe [54], the CRF
is built using PyStruct [53].
Unary training We initialise the AlexNet [52] network with ImageNet [55]
pretrained model, and use the following parameters from [30] to fine-tune the
respective models:
base_lr: 0.0001
lr_policy: "step"
gamma: 0.1
stepsize: 50000
max_iter: 300000
momentum: 0.9
weight_decay: 0.0005
We choose the batch size 50. This corresponds to ∼ 500 epochs. This setting is
used for fine-tuning all the unary models, including the ones adapted to different
head obfuscation types (black, white, and blur).
Pairwise Training The network consists of the Siamese part with our unary
model, followed by three fully connect layers with 16384×4096, 4096×4096, and
4096 × 2 dimensional weights. First two fully connected layers are followed by
ReLU activation layers, and additional dropout layers (with 0.5 chance) during
training phase.
The network is first trained on the PIPA train set, and then fine-tuned for
split0 instances (tagged). The learning parameters are as follows for both training
and fine-tuning:
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base_lr: 0.00001
lr_policy: "step"
gamma: 0.5
stepsize: 2000
iter_size: 8
max_iter: 10000 # 5000 for split0 fine-tuning
momentum: 0.9
momentum2: 0.999
weight_decay: 0.0000
clip_gradients: 10
solver_type: ADAM
We choose the batch size of 100 and maintain the same ratio of positive and neg-
ative pairs (1 : 9) for each batch. The training pairs consist of the pairs within
PIPA albums because eventually these are the edges used in the graph inference.
Depending on the setting (within/across events), 10K training iterations corre-
spond to 1∼2 epochs. We stop at 10K training iterations, as the loss does not
decrease further. For fine-tuning, we stop at 5K iterations.
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C Unaries recognition accuracy
Tables 2 and 3 show the accuracy of the unary system alone in the presence of
head obfuscation and with different tag rates, respectively.
Table 2: Impact of head obfuscation on the unary term. Validation set accuracy
is shown. (Equivalent to figure 3 in main paper)
Visible Blur Black White Naive
Setting Raw Adapt Raw Adapt Raw Adapt Baseline
Within events 91.5 84.3 86.7 80.1 80.9 78.3 79.6 1.04
Across events 47.4 23.5 28.8 14.0 14.7 13.1 13.7 4.65
Table 3: Impact of tag rate on the unary term. Validation set accuracy is shown.
(Equivalent to figure 4 in main paper)
Setting Tag rate Visible Blur Black White
Within events
1.25 69.9 63.1 57.3 54.6
2.5 78.2 71.8 65.0 63.0
5 83.6 78.0 70.9 69.0
10 91.5 86.7 80.9 79.6
Across events
1.25 34.9 22.2 11.4 10.9
2.5 38.5 24.3 12.2 11.2
5 42.7 24.5 12.0 11.4
10 47.4 28.8 14.7 13.7
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D Pairwise term
Fine-tuning network on split0 helps matching. We discussed the effective-
ness of fine-tuning on split0 examples in the main paper. Here, we provide ROC
curves for the visible pair models before and after fine-tuning on the validation
set (figure 11). We observe that the matching network indeed performs better
when it has been trained on split0 examples of the identities to be queried.
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Fig. 11: Validation set ROC curves for the matching network (visible pair type)
before and after the split0 fine-tuning.
Unary baseline We introduced the unary baseline person matcher in the main
paper in order to verify that the network has learned to predict a match better
than its initialisation model. We provide further details here.
The match probability of a person pair (Xi, Xj) is computed solely from
the unary prediction probabilities φθ(·|Xi) and φθ(·|Xj). In order to model the
match confidence, we use the average H (Xi, Xj) of the unary entropies H(Xi)
and H(Xj), where the entropy H(X) is
∑
Y
[−φθ(Y |X) log (φθ(Y |X))].
Specifically, the unary baseline match probability is computed as follows:
1. Compute unary predictions Y˜i = argmax
Y
φθ(Y |Xi) and Y˜j = argmax
Y
φθ(Y |Xj).
2. Compute average entropy H(Xi, Xj) = (H(Xi)+H(Xj))/2.
3. Compute the match probability:
ψunary (Xi, Xj) =
{
1− 12H (Xi, Xj) if Y˜i = Y˜j
1
2H (Xi, Xj) if Y˜i 6= Y˜j
For a typical unary prediction, entropy takes a value < 0.5. Thus, if Y˜i = Y˜j ,
then the match probability is within [0.5, 1], with a lower value when the mean
entropy (uncertainty) is higher; in the other case Y˜i 6= Y˜j , it takes a value in
[0, 0.5] with a higher value for higher mean entropy (uncertainty).
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E CRF inference
In this section, we supplement the discussion about the following inference prob-
lem in the main paper.
argmax
Y
1
|V |
∑
i∈V
φθ(Yi|Xi) + α|E|
∑
(i, j)∈E
1[Yi=Yj ]ψθ˜(Xi, Xj). (2)
We describe the effect of changing values of α in §E.1. We then discuss the
pruning (§E.2) and approximate inference (§E.3) strategies to realise efficient
inference. We include the numerical results for the validation graph inference
experiment (figure 7 in the main paper) in §E.4.
E.1 Changing α
We use the unary-pairwise balancing term α = 100 for all the experiments in the
main paper, as the performance reaches a plateau for α around 100. In figure 12,
we show the performance of the system in three different scenarios (S1, S2, and
S3) at different values of α on the validation set. Black obfuscation is used for
scenarios S2 and S3. We observe that the plateau is reached at around α = 100
for both within and across events cases.
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Fig. 12: Effect of α on the inference performance.
E.2 Graph pruning
Inter-album edge pruning As described in the main paper, we prune the full
graph down by only having fully connected cliques within albums. As shown in
table 4, this reduces the number of edges by two orders of magnitude. This also
allows album-wise parallel computation in a multi-core environment.
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Table 4: Problem size for the graphical models.
Setting Test/Val #classes #nodes #edges (pruned) #albums
Within events Test 581 6 443 20 752 903 (252 431) 351Val 366 4 820 11 613 790 (228 116) 300
Across events Test 199 2 485 3 086 370 (51 633) 192Val 65 1 076 578 350 (17 095) 137
We provide details of the “preliminary oracle experiments” discussed in §5.3
of main paper. In order to quantify how much we lose from the pruning, we per-
form an oracle experiments assuming perfect propagation (given actual unaries)
on the validation set. In the within events case, perfect propagation inside al-
bum cliques already gives 98.6%, compared to 99.8% for full graph propagation.
Thus, nearly all the information for a perfect inference is already present inside
each album. Under the across events, the oracle numbers are 79.8% (inside al-
bum propagation) and 89.2% (full graph propagation). As current unary model
performance on across events (47.4%) is still far worse than those oracles, we
choose efficiency over the extra 10% boost in the oracle performance.
Negative edge pruning We prune edges below certain match score (ψθ˜(Xi,Xj) <
β), as simply adding pairwise terms can hurt the performance (figure 7 in main
paper). In figure 13, we show the performance of the Faceless Recognition sys-
tem on the validation set at different pruning thresholds β ∈ [0, 1]. Again for
obfuscation scenarios (S2 and S3), black obfuscation is used. As mentioned in the
main paper, we observe that any threshold in the range [0.4, 0.7] works equally
fine, and thus use β = 0.5 in all the experiments.
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Fig. 13: Effect of negative edge pruning on the inference performance.
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E.3 Approximate inference
For further efficiency, we perform approximate inference on the graph. Specifi-
cally, given a node to infer identity, we consider propagations only on the neigh-
bouring edges for the node. Since the resulting graph is a tree, this significantly
reduces the computation time, while achieving similar (even better) accuracy
than the full max-product inference (table 5). For within events, the reduction
in inference time for the whole validation set is from 15 hours to only 714 seconds.
Table 5: Computational time and accuracy for inference algorithms. Via paral-
lelisation, inference was performed on up to 32 albums in tandem.
Setting (scenario=S1) Inference Time Accuracy
Within events
Unary only - 91.5
Tree approximation 714 sec 91.8
Max-product 15 hrs 91.4
Across events
Unary only - 47.4
Tree approximation 5 sec 55.0
Max-product 87 sec 52.2
E.4 Full validation set results
We include the full numerical results for the validation set graphical inference
results (figure 7 in the main paper) in table 6 below.
Table 6: Validation performance of CRF joint inference, under black fill-in ob-
fuscation for scenarios S2 and S3. (Equivalent to figure 7 in main paper)
Setting Combination S1 S2 S3
Within events
unary 91.5 80.9 80.9
unary+pairwise 91.8 81.9 81.1
unary+pairwise (no pruning) 67.3 47.3 43.9
unary+pairwise (oracle) 98.2 96.5 92.8
Across events
unary 47.4 14.7 14.7
unary+pairwise 55.0 39.2 17.8
unary+pairwise (no pruning) 47.5 29.4 15.1
unary+pairwise (oracle) 58.1 53.8 19.9
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F Computation time
For unary convnet training, it takes 1 ∼ 2 days to train on a single GPU ma-
chine. Unary logistic regression training takes ∼ 30 minutes. On a single GPU,
pairwise matching network training and fine-tuning take ∼ 12 hours and ∼ 6
hours, respectively.
Details for graph inference time is found in table 5. Note that before inter-
album pruning, inference over the entire test set takes more than several days.
However, after pruning and applying the approximate inference, it takes ∼ 5
seconds for across events, and ∼10 minutes for within events.
G Test results
Numerical results for the figures 8 and 9 of the main paper are presented below
(tables 8 and 7). Tables show the accuracy of the Faceless Recognition system
under different scenarios (Sτ1 , S2, and S3) in within and across events cases.
Table 7: Test set accuracy of Faceless Recognition system with respect to differ-
ent tag rates. (Equivalent to figure 9 in main paper)
Visible Naive
Setting Combination S1.251 S2.51 S51 S101 Baseline
Within events Unary 54.2 65.1 74.5 86.4 0.78Unary+Pairwise 56.8 68.3 77.0 86.4 0.78
Across events Unary 30.5 34.5 39.1 45.8 1.97Unary+Pairwise 31.9 38.7 44.7 51.1 1.97
Table 8: Test set accuracy of Faceless Recognition system on difference scenarios
with two obfuscation types, black and blur. (Equivalent to figure 8 in main
paper)
Visible Blur Black Naive
Setting Combination S101 S2 S3 S2 S3 Baseline
Within events Unary 86.4 79.5 79.5 71.1 71.1 0.78Unary+Pairwise 86.4 79.8 79.2 72.6 71.3 0.78
Across events Unary 45.8 30.7 30.7 19.6 19.6 1.97Unary+Pairwise 51.1 41.4 36.0 35.0 23.9 1.97
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H Qualitative results
See figure 14 for additional qualitative examples of success cases. Note the diffi-
culty of the dataset (various pose, back view, and changing clothing).
Fig. 14: Examples of queries, not identified using only tagged examples (red
boxes), but successfully identified by joint inference on both query and non-
tagged examples (white boxes). A subset of both tagged and non-tagged samples
are shown; there are ∼10 tagged and non-tagged samples on average. Non-tagged
examples are ordered in the match score against the query (closest match on the
left).
